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Abstract 
Frequently, a monopolist or dominant firm in an input market also sells a complementary 
product for which the input is indispensable. It is often the case that the monopolist faces 
significant competition in the complementary goods markets. For example, a LEC is a 
monopolist in the provision of terminating and originating access for long distance service. If 
T w e r e  presently allowed to offer long distance service, it would be competing with a number- 
of other carriers. In a second important example, Microsoft is dominant in the operating 
systems market for personal computers and it also sells various applications that require the 
use of the operating system. In many of the applications markets, such as the market for 
internet browsers, Microsoft faces significant competition. 
- 
This paper shows that the monopolist has incentives (i) to raise the costs of its rivals in the 
complementary markets; and (ii) to degrade the quality of the monopolized good when this 
good is combined with complementary goods of its competitors. Such behavior is expected 
by LECs once they enter the long distance market. Microsoft may also have exhibited such 
behavior by (i) bundling Internet Explorer with Windows95; and (ii) by seamlessly integrating 
Internet Explorer 4.0 with Windows Explorer in Windows95 and Windows98. 
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Raising Rivals' Costs in Complementary Goods Markets: 
LECs Entering into Long Distance and Microsoft Bundling 
Internet Explorer 
1. Introduction 
Suppose that a firm monopolizes a market that provides a required input for a 
complementary market. Assume further that the monopolist also provides the complementary 
product through a subsidiary. Besides the monopolist's subsidiary, a number of other 
independent companies participate in the complementary good market. Under these 
conditions, we show that the monopolist has an incentive to (i) raise the costs of the rivals to 
its downstream subsidiary; and (ii) degrade the of the monopolized good offered to the 
downstream rivals of its subsidiary. These actions of the monopolist reduce competition and 
social welfare. 
The application of this model to telecommunications is immediate. Presently, a LEC 
has a monopoly over access origination and termination of all calls in the area over which it - 
has a monopoly franchise.' Access is a required input in the production of long distance 
calls. If a LEC is allowed in long distance, the setup matches the assumptions of the model. 
Thus, we expect, once a LEC is allowed in long distance, it will have the incentive to raise 
the costs of its long distance rivals as well as to degrade the quality of the access it sells to 
its long distance rivals. Given the anticompetitiveeffects that would result under these . 
conditions, entry of LECs in long distance should not be allowed until there is vigorous 
competition in the local exchange market. We discuss the application to the 
telecommunications markets in more detail in section 3. 
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This setup also has immediate applications to the Personal Computer ("PC") software 
market. The market for operating systems ("OS") is monopolized by Microsoft. Microsoft 
also produces software applications. In many of the application markets, Microsoft faces 
significant competition. Thus, the conditions of these markets fit the assumptions of the 
model. It follows that we expect that Microsoft has an incentive to raise the costs of its 
rivals in the applications arena and to degrade the quality of the operating system services 
that they receive compared to the quality of the operating system services that the Microsoft 
applications receive. We discuss the application of this model to the operating systems a ~ d  
internet browsers m i e t  in section 4. This issue is particularly timely given the current case 
of the United States v. Microsoft. 
- 
2. ~heorerns~ 
This section proves the necessary mathematid results. Mathematics challenged 
readers can skip the proofs and proceed directly to the statements of the theorems. 
Suppose that a firm is a monopolist in upstream market A. The output of market A is 
required for production in market B. Assume, for simplicity, that one unit of A is required 
for each unit of market B. The monopolist participates in the downstream market through a 
subsidiary which we - name firm 1. There are also n-1 independent firms competing in the 
downstream market (i = 2, ..., n), making a total of n competitors downstream. These firms 
produce a homogeneous product and choose their quantities strategically a-la-Cot~rnot. 
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Formally, let the monopolist have upstream (downstream) fixed cost F" (FD), 
upstream constant marginal cost c, and sell all units at price w realizing profits from 
upstream operations of 
Downstream firm i produces qi and total downstream production is Q = q, + Xi+] qi. Let 
downstream market price be p(Q). Then the profits of the monopolist from the downstream 
market are 
- 
= (p - s - w)q, - FD7 
-- 
- 
with total profits of the monopolist being 
.- 
n, = ny + np = (W - C)Q + (p - s - w)q, - ( F ~  + F"). (3) 
- 
Downstream firms face an extra cost, denoted by r, that reflects the actions of the 
upstream monopolist to raise the cos4s of the rivals of its subsidiary through quality 
degradation and other actions. A typical independent firm i has profits . 
Firms play a Cournot game that leads to equilibrium outputs q: 4 ,  i = 2, ..., n, and 
Q* = q; + (n - I ) k 7  with equilibrium price p ( ~ * )  and equilibrium profits I1; for the 
monopolist and Ifl for each independent firm. 
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The crucial question is the variation of the monopolist's profits Il; with the level of 
the extra cost r that it imposes on downstream rivals. If there exists a positive r such that 
n;(r) > IlT(O), then the monopolist has an incentive to raise the costs by such r > 0. 
One way to search for such an r is to examine the effect on the monopolist's 
equilibrium profits Il; of small increases of r above zero. If we find dIl;/dr > 0, then the 
monopolist has an incentive to increase rivals' costs. Even if dnY/dr < 0 at r = 0, there 
----still may exist some level of r such that Ilr(r) > nT(0) provided that for larger r, dIl;/dr > 
0. 
- 
- In this paper, we prove that, when the monopolist's subsidiary and thmndependent 
firms have the same costs, dIl;/dr > 0 for all r> 0, and therefore the monopolist has an 
incentive to increase r until the independent competitors are driven out of business 
(Theorem 1). In terns of social surplus, we show that increasing the downstream rivals' 
- 
costs decreases social welfare (Theorem 2). When the monopolist's subsidiary has lower 
cssts than the independents, the same is true (Theorem 3). When the monopolist's subsidiary 
has higher costs than the independents, we show that dn;/dr < 0 for small r and dIl;/dr > 
0 for large r. In this case, we also show that the monopolist has an incentive to increase 
- 
- 
the costs of rivals until they are driven out of business (Theorem 3). 
The key to all the theorems is the fact that all incentives are evaluated at the non- 
- 
cooperative (Cournot) equilibrium. When all firms use the same technology, this equilibrium 
is defined by 
dIl,/dq, = p + q,p'(Q) - (c + s) = 0. (5 )  
dIl,/dq, = p + q,p'(Q) - (w + s + r) = 0. ( 6 )  
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for i = 2, ..., n. Note that the monopolist has lower marginal costs of downstream output ( c  
rather than w), since w cancels out in its profits. This implies, that, even if the monopolist 
does not increase the costs of its downstream rivals (r = O), the monopolist will be producing 
more downstream output than the independents. 
Combining (5 )  and (6) by multiplying (6) with (n-1) and adding it to (5) we can 
define industry output Q* without reference to the individual firms7 outputs: 
np(Q*) + Q*p'(Q*) = ns + c + (n - l)(w + r). (7) 
To assess the effects of increases in rivals' costs r on welfare and profits we nee- 
calculate the effects on increases in r on the output of independents, the monopolist's 
subsidiary and on total downstream output. The effect on industyy__output is easily derived 
from total differentiation of (7): 
This is negative when 
(n + 1)p' + Q*p" < 0. 
Condition (9), a standard regularity condition in Cournot oligopoly, is equivalent to an equal 
increase in marginal cost of all firms resulting in a decrease in output and an increase in 
price, i.e., 
dQ*/ds < 0 w dp(Q*)/ds > 0 u (n + 1)p' + Q*p" < 0 w dQ*/dr < 0. (10) 
An increase in r unambiguously reduces welfare since total industry sales are reduced. 
Total differentiation of (5) implies 
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dq;/dr = -(dQ*/dr)(p' + qyp")/p'. 
This is positive, given dQc/dr <O, when 
p' + qTp" < 0. 
Condition (12) is also a standard regularity condition in Cournot oligopoly that is equivalent 
to a downward sloping best reply function of firm 1, or equivalently, that q, and C,,, qi are 
strategic substitutes. - 
We have shown that a discriminatory increasein thecost of downstream rivals results 
in a decrease in industry output, an increase in final output price, a decrease in the output of 
each independent firm, and an increase - in the output of the monopolist's subsidiary. 
The incentive that the upstream monopolist has to marginally increase the costs of the 
rivals of its downstream subsidiary is measured by - 
- 
The total effect of increases in r on profits, dIlr/dr, can be dissected (from (13)) in three 
parts. The first part, (w - c)(dQc/dr) < 0, represents the reduction of profits of the monopolist 
- 
in its upstream operations. The second part, (qrp')(dQ*/dr) > 0, represents the positive effect 
on the downstream subsidiary's revenues (holding the subsidiary's output constant) 
precipitated by the downstream price increase that results from increasing the costs of the 
independent competitors. The third part, (p - s - w)(dq;/dr) > 0, represents the increased 
revenues from expanded sales of the subsidiary, keeping price constant. The essence of the 
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proof that dIl;/dr > 0 relies on the fact that the combination of the first and the second parts 
is positive. Since the third part is positive (from the profit maximization condition of the 
independents), the result follows. 
The proof flows easily from the profit maximization conditions of the firms. For each 
firm, marginal revenue must equal marginal cost so that 
This implies 
MC, - MC, =MR,  - MR, e w + r - c = (4 - q;)p' 
- 
It follows that the combination of the first two terms in (13) is positive, 
The third term in the marginal profit decomposition in (13) is also positive from 
is positive from the independents' profit maximization (6), 
Combining the effects, we have that increases in rivals' costs result in increases in the profits 
of the monopolist. Further increases in rivals' costs result in even higher profits of the 
- 
monopolist. Therefore the monopolist has an-incentive to increase rivals' costs until they are 
driven out of business. 
Theorem 1: A monopolist in an upstream market has an incentive to increase the 
costs of rivals to its downstream subsidiary until they are driven out of business3 
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Theorem 2: Any increase in rival's costs increases the subsidiary's output, 
decreases the output of rivals, decreases industry output, increases the downstream 
price, and decreases social welfare. 
Our setup this far has been of a discriminatory strategy that increases the costs of 
downstream rivals but does not affect the demand functions of the subsidiary or of the 
independents. However, inspection of the profit maximization conditions (5) and (6) shows 
that our results also hold for a discriminatory degradation of the quality of the input offered 
to rivals w W  decreases the willingness to pay for the rivals' downstream output but leaves 
costs unaffected. In such a setup, independent downstream firms have marginal cost w + s, 
- 
but, since they have a lower quality product, consumers are willing to pay only p - r for their 
product (while consumers pay p for the subsidiary's output). That is, the independents face 
a demand curve that is a parallel downward shift by r of the demand faced by the 
- 
subsidiary. In this setup, clearly the marginal profit of each firm is the same as before, and 
therefore the equilibrium quantities and profits are also the same. Thus, we have proved that 
our results hold if the strategy of raising rivals' cost is substituted by a discriminatory 
strategy of degrading the quality of the input supplied to the rivals so that the quality of the 
- 
output of the rivals is degraded. 
- 
It can also be easily shown that the monopolist has no incentive to increase the costs 
of all downstream firms, including it subsidiary. Thus, the monopolist only has an incentive 
for increasing rivals costs in a discriminatory manner. 
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We now examine the case of different production costs for the monopolist's subsidiary 
and the independents for linear demand. Suppose that the monopolist faces an extra marginal 
cost x for downstream production. x = 0 represents the standard case; x > 0 (< 0) if the 
monopolist has a cost disadvantage (advantage) in the downstream prod~ction.~ The 
monopolist7s profits from downstream operations are now 
while all other profit functions remain unaffected. For a linear demand 
- 
- p = a - bQ7 
with a > w + s + r > 0, b > 0, the Cournot equilibrium is now:5 
- * - q, = [a - s - cn - nx + (n - l)(w + r)]/[b(n + I)], 
q: = [a + c - s + x - 2(w + r)]/[b(n + I)], i #  1, 
- 
Q* = [(a - s)n - c - x - (w + r)(n - l)]/[b(n + I)], 
and the realized profits are: 
The incentive to marginally increase rivals7 costs is measured by 
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Positive production by independent firms implies 
Therefore, substituting (27) in (28), 
Thus, when the monopolist has a cost advantage, x < 0, or when the technoIogies are 
the same, x = 0, the monopolist clearly has an incentive to raise rivals' costs by any feasible 
- 
r, that is, dH;/dr > 0 for all r > 0. I next show that, when the monopolist has a cost 
disadvantage, x > 0, he also has an incentive to significantly increase rivals' costs. 
- Considering I'I; as a function of r, and integrating both sides of (29), results in 
Note that !$ f(r)dr = 0, and f(r) > 0 for r > x 2 0. Therefore, for any r > 2x, 
x ( r )  - I'I;(O) > 0 + fix f(r)dr > 0. ( 3  1) 
- 
- 
Thus, the monopolist has an incentive to raise rivals' costs b y  an amount that exceeds twice 
its own cost disadvantage. Also note that d21'IT/dri! > 0, so that t R  monopolist has an 
incentive to increase downstream rivals7 costs to higher and higher levels, stopping only when 
the downstream rivals are out of business. This is an optimal policy from the point of view 
of the monopolist provided that at r = 2x the sales of the independents from (24) are 
positive, i.e., when a + c - s - 21.v > x. 
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When the sales of the independents implied by (21) would be negative at r = 2x, the 
optimal policy for the monopolist is to set r = (a + c - s + x - 2w)/2 or higher, so that all 
competitors are driven out of business, 4 = 0, and the monopolist remains the only active 
firm, realizing qr = Q*, p*, ny*, and nf* from (20), (22) - (25) at n = 1. Thus, if the cost 
disadvantage of the monopolist's subsidiary is so large that r = 2x would give negative sales 
to the independents, the monopolist will increase the rivals costs up to the point at which all 
independents are driven out of business. 
- 
Theorem 3: Even if the monopolist's subsidiary has a cost &wantage or 
disadvantage compared to its rivals, the monopolist - still has an incentive to increase the 
costs of rivals to its downstream subsidiary until they are driven out of business. 
- 
-- 
The above theorems - point to strong incentives to discriminate against chrwnstream 
rivals by raising their costs and drive them out of business. The traditional method of 
avoiding vertical foreclosure has been the imposition of imputation rules on the integrated 
monopolist. An imputation rule imposes a price floor for the output of the monopolist's 
subsidiary, equal to the upstream input price plus the cost of other inputs to a downstream - 
firm. We shownext that, when the monopolist raises the costs of its rivals, traditional 
imputation rules fail to safeguard against discrimination. Thus, imputation fails to safeguard 
even against foreclosure of downstream rivals. It follows that imputation also fails to 
safeguard against less extreme effects of dis~rimination.~ 
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To survive, even if its fixed costs are zero, an independent firm has to have positive 
production, 
Substituting in equation (26) with FD = 0, independents' survival implies that the 
downstream market price should follow 
p * 2 w + s + r  w + - ( w + s ) > r ,  (33) 
i.e., that the downstream market price should exceed a floor equal to the sum of three costs: 
-
- 
(i) the monopolist's price of the upstream input to the rivals, w; (ii) the cost of other inputs to 
- 
the downstream process, s; and, (iii) the cost to rivals that results from the monopolist's 
- 
-- 
discrimination, r. It follows that the application of a traditional imputation floor of p* 2 w + 
s is not sufficient. Firms can easily be foreclosed - under the traditional imputation floor 
- 
Theorem 4: The monopolist can use the strategy of raising downstream rivals' 
costs to circumvent traditional imputation floors and foreclose its rivals. 
3. ~pplication to Telecommunications Markets 
In this section, we apply the results to telecommunications markets. The breakup of 
AT&T by the Modification of Final Judgement ("MFJ") resulted in a potentially competitive 
long distance market and in a number of local monopolies for local services. In the 13 years 
that followed the MFJ, the long distance market has become effectively competitive. 
However, each local services market remained monopolized by a Local Exchange Carrier 
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("LEC") which had an exclusive monopoly franchise in the period between the MFJ and the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Act" or "1996 ~ c t " ) . '  
The goal of the 1996 Act was to open all telecommunications markets to competition. 
To achieve this, the Act (i) envisions the elimination of artificial and regulatory barriers to 
entry; (ii) facilitates the entry of new competitors in local markets by creating two novel ways 
of entry; and (iii) allows for the entry of LECs in long distance markets only after they have 
fulfilled a number of conditions (including allowing entry in their respective local markets) 
and can prove that such entry is in the public interest. 
By attempting to elimin-ate barriers to entry, the Act tries to structurally increase 
competition, especially in the local exchange market. The Act mandates interconnection by 
all carriers. To facilitate entry in the local exchange, the Act allows for two novel ways of 
entry besides entry through the installation of own facilities. The first way allows entry in 
the retailing part of the telecommunications business by requiring incumbent - local exchange 
carriers ("ILECs") to sell at wholesale prices to entrants any retail service that they offer.8 
Such entry is essentially limited to the retailing part of the market. 
The second and most significant novel way of entry introduced by the Act is through 
leasing of unbundled network elements from incumbents. In particular, the Act requires that 
ILECs (i) unbundle their networks; and (ii) that they offer for lease to entrants network 
- 
components (unbundled network elements, "UNEs") "at cost plus reasonable p r ~ f i t . " ~  Thus, 
the Act envisions the telecommunications network as a decentralized network of 
interconnected networks. 
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Many firms, including the large interexchange carriers AT&T and MCI attempted to 
enter the market through "arbitration" agreements with ILECs under the supervision of State 
Regulatory Commissions, according to the procedure outlined by the Act. The arbitration 
process proved to be extremely long and difficult, with continuous legal obstacles and appeals 
raised by the ILECs. To this date (January 1998),' almost two years after the signing of the 
Act by President Clinton, arbitrations have been concluded in very few States, and entry in 
the local exchange has been minimal. 
- 
The 1996 Act establishes three general requirements that Bell Operating Companies 
( 'WCs")  must fulfill before being permitted to provide in-region interLATA services. First, ---- - 
the BOC must show that it is providing interconnection to other local exchange - providers that 
provide services predominantly over their own facilities. Moreover, the terms and conditions 
under which the BOC provides such interconnection to competitive carriers must conform to 
and fully implement the standards established by section 271 of the 1996 Act. 
- 
Second, a BOC seeking to provide in-region interLATA services must comply with the 
1996 Act's non-discrimination and structural separation provisions. The FCC has interpreted 
these provisions to mean that not only must the BOC not discriminate among third parties, 
but that regulators must also be able to establish that the BOC does not discriminate between 
itself (or subsidiaries) and third party proTTders. 
- 
Finally, the 1996 Act requires that the FCC determine whether the approval of a BOC 
application to provide in-region interLATA service in a particular state is in the public 
interest. From an economic standpoint, such a determination requires an assessment that 
shows that the benefits accruing to telecommunications consumers because of approval of the 
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application exceed any and all potential harm to those consumers resulting from BOC entry 
into long distance. 
The Act allows entry of local companies in long distance after a checklist of 
conditions have been met.'' The 1996 Act provides that even if all these conditions are met, 
the entry of RBOCs into long distance must also be in the public interest. This implies that 
there is a significant hurdle for RBOCs' entry in long distance which may be more difficult to 
o v e r c o m ~ a n  the fulfillment of the above checklist. 
Despite significant efforts by entrants, primarily inter-exchange carriers ("IXCs"), to 
enter-tocal-exchange markets by leasing unbundled network elements from incumbents, t b -  
incumbents have found a variety of ways to circumvent such entry." Thus, if regulators 
presently allow entry of a local exchange carrier in the long distance market in the LEC's 
own region, such a LEC will be a monopolist in access. Since access is a required input for 
long d i s t an~se rv ice ,  a vertically integrated LEC providing in-region long distance would 
closely fit the-assumptions of our model.12 Thus, the LEC will have an incentive to raise 
- 
the costs of the downstream rivals of its long distance subsidiary and skirt imputation rules 
set by regulators. Such actions are anti-competitive and against the public interest. Because 
there is no discernable Fenefit-of entry of LECs into long distance (since the long distance 
market is already effectively competitive), entry of LECs into in-region long distance service 
- 
is not in the public interest and should not be allowed until there is vigorous competition in 
the local exchange market. 
4. Application to the opera tin^ Systems-Browsers Markets 
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The market for operating systems for personal computers is monopolized by 
~ i c r o s o f t . ' ~  In 1994, the US Department of Justice sued Microsoft for monopolization and 
other offenses. The case was settled by a consent decree in 1995." On October 20, 1997, 
the Department of Justice asked the court supervising the implementation of the 1994 consent 
decree to find Microsoft in civil contempt and to fine Microsoft $1 million per day for 
allegedly violating the licensing part of the consent decree. 
Among others, the DOJ alleges that Microsoft violated section IV(E) of the consent 
decree. Section IV(E) of the consent decree states under "prohibited conduct:" 
"E. Microsoft shall not enter into any License Agreem-[with an OEM] in which the 
terms of that agreement are expressly or impliedly conditioned upon: (i) the licensing 
of any other Covered Product, Operating System Software product or other product 
(provided, however, that this provision in and of itself shall not be construed to 
prohibit Microsoft from developing integrated products); or (ii) the OEM not licensing, 
purchasing, using or distributing any non-Microsoft product." 
The DOJ alleges that Microsoft required Original Equipment Manufacturers ("OEMs") to 
install Internet Explorer 3 ("IE3.0") and Internet Explorer 4 ("IE4.0") if they installed 
- Windows95 on new personal computers, and that this violated section IV(E) of the consent 
- decree. 
- 
Judge Jackson issued a preliminary injunction on December 11, 1997 requiring 
Microsoft to provide an "unbundled choice" of Windows95 by itself to OEMs.15 Microsoft 
complied on January 22, 1998. '~ Up that time, Microsoft claimed that it was technically 
unfeasible to unbundle Internet Explorer from Windows95 without damaging the functionality 
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of Windows95. This is an important issue of fact that needs to be clarified. Another 
important issue in the case is if the Internet Explorer is a "product" with its own market, as 
DOJ claims, rather than another "feature" or "function" of Windows95 as Microsoft claims. 
This is particularly important since the consent decree (see the quote from the Consent Decree 
above) allows Microsoft to create "integrated products." 
Besides these important issues of fact which we will not discuss in this paper, there is 
the crucial issue: was the alleged Microsoft behavior (which Microsoft has not disputed this 
far) anticompetitive? - 
The results of this paper show that Microsoft has e i n c e n t i v e  to impose on OEMs 
the requirement that they also install - Internet Explorer so that rivals7 costs are raised. In the 
context of the framework of this paper, the alleged actions of Microsoft appear to be 
- 
increasing rivals' costs and therefore be anticompetitive. If it takes time or effort for a user 
to install - a competing browser, Microsoft has an advantage if its m w s e r  is already installed 
by the PC manufacturer. This advantage can be significant if Microsoft bundles IE3.0 and 
IE4.0 and Windows95, given the very large market share of Windows95 in the market for 
operating systems for PCs. 
Moreover, the seamlessly integrated IE4.0 in Windows Explorer in late Versions of 
Winzws95 (and very likely in Windows98) provides an integrated product that many may 
find superior to the combination of disintegrated Windows95 (and Windows98) and an internet 
browser. Presently, the hooks that integrate IE4.0 with Windows Explorer are only known to 
Microsoft. Thus, Microsoft effectively sells an operating system which is of lower quality 
when used with an "outside" browser. Therefore any competitor in the browser market is 
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disadvantaged, since it cannot create a product of equal features. This paper has shown that 
the degradation of quality of the monopolized product when this product is combined with 
complementary products of competitors is anticompetitive and harmful to social welfare. 
A level playing field will be restored and the public interest will be protected if 
Microsoft discloses the hooks that integrate IE4.0 with Windows Explorer so rival browsers to 
be equally searnlessly integrated with the operating system and are not disadvantaged. This is 
not the present remedy asked by&OJ, but it may be one that will be proposed in the 
investigation of Windows98 that, according to Reuters, the DOJ is currently pursuing. 
It should be noted tkat-Micnnssoft's ability to raise rivals' costs is limited by the fact 
that Microsoft has traditionally opted for open systems and discloses APIs that allow 
- 
independent software developers to create applications that run on Windows operating 
- 
systems. It has been claimed that Microsoft's monopoly power (and associated ability to 
raise rivals costs) arises from its cofltrol of the "desktop" of a PC, i.e., the appearance of the 
PC's screen, and of Windows Explorer, a program that manages various key tasks. However, 
it is feasible for an independent software developer to replace the whole desktop without 
replacing the operating system. In fact, as early as 1995, Symantec has been selling a 
replacement for Windows Explorer. Thus, the Extent to which browser rivals' costs can be 
raised is limited by the availability of very close substitutes for the "desktop" and Windows 
Explorer sold by independent vendors. This limits the extent of welfare loss that can be 
created by raising rivals' costs and, in imposing remedies, should be balanced with possible 
adverse effects of the remedies. Potential adverse effects of the disclosure remedy are a lack 
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of control of the Windows code, a potential dilution of the trademark of Windows, and a 
slowing of technological change. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines an industry where a monopolist produces an input that is required 
for the production of complementary goods or services, and the monopolist has a subsidiary 
that produces the complementary good or service. This setup of this paper would describe 
telecommunications markets if incumbent local exchange carriers entered the long distance - 
market (as they have- frequently asked) before vigorous competition emerges in the local 
exchange market. This setup also describes the state of competition in personal computers 
- 
where Microsoft has a monopoly in operating systems and also produces applications 
(complementary goods) such as Internet browsers. 
We prove that a monopolist has strong incentives to raise the costs of the rivals to its 
- 
subsidiary until they are driven out of business, and that such actions are anti-competitive and 
detrimental to social welfare. In the telecommunications application, the results of this paper 
predict that once local exchange carriers enter long distance they will have incentives to 
disadvantage competitors by raising their costs or degrading their quality.17 In the computer 
application, the model predicts that Microsoft will increaserhe costs of its applications rivals 
- 
as well as degrade the quality of the Operating System it monopolizes when used with 
applications of competitors. The DOJ, in its 1994 case against Microsoft, had alleged the 
existence of "hidden functions" in Windows95 that gave an anti-competitive advantage to 
Microsoft. As explained in detail in section 4 of this paper, bundling of Internet Explorer 
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with Windows95, which is at the center of the current DOJ case against Microsoft, may raise 
rivals7 costs. 
Moreover the seamless integration of Internet Explorer 4.0 with Windows Explorer in 
Windows95 (and very likely in Windows98) effectively lowers the quality of the operating 
system when used with an unintegrated browser. Presently, competing browsers do not have 
access to the hooks that would allow the seamless integration of their browsers to the 
operating system. A remedy that would level the playing field would be the public disclosure 
of the hooks that make the seamless integration possible. However, because of the existence 
of competing "desktop" and "file manager" applications, the ability of Microsoft t o k e  -- 
browser rivals' costs is limited and can be overcome if competitors offer browsers that are 
- 
sufficiently superior to Internet Explorer. In contrast, facing no close substitutes to its access 
- 
monopoly, a local telephone company with a long distance subsidiary has unlimited ability to 
raise the costs of long distance competitors. - 
- 
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1. Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs) have less than 1 % market share in access 
origination and termination. 
2. This section is based on Economides (1998a). 
3. The derivation shows that condition (9) (decrease in industry output as a response to a 
marginal cost increase) is sufficient for the result. 
4. A cost advantage for the monopolist may arise when there are synergies in the joint 
production of the upstream and downstream components. 
5. In comparison to the case of no extra cost to the monopolist (x = 0), in the equilibrium with 
x > 0, production by independents and market price are higher, while production by the 
integrated rmmopolist and industry-wide production are lower. 
6. Even in the absence of non-price discrimination strategies, such as the strategy of raising 
rivals costs, imputation cannot fully safeguard against price discrimination effects. Even if the 
integram moTopolist adheres to an imputation rule and charges itself as much as it charges 
others for the essential input, in the profit maximization of the integrated firm, the cost of using 
one more unit of this input is its true marginal cost, and not what the integrated firm charges 
others (and itself). Thus, since the integrated firm makes more profit for every unit of output 
than its rivals even when, under Cournot, they all sell at the same downstream price, the 
integrated firm in equilibrium has a higher scale of operation and can, for some range of fixed 
costs, foreclose its opponents. 
Moreover, for an imputation policy to have the desired effect, full observability of costs 
is required - -zond i t ion  that is unlikely to be fulfilled. This may be particularly difficult since 
typically firms do not have an incentive to accurately reveal their costs to the regulator. 
- 
7. The LECs are the 7 original Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs") that came out 
of the breakup of AT&T (Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Bell, 
Southwestern Bell, US West), plus a number of independents, the largest of which is GTE. In 
1996, Southwestern Bell (SBC) acquired Pacific Bell, and, in 1997, Bell Atlantic Acquired 
NYNEX, thus reducing the number of RBOCs to 5. In December 1997, SBC announced its 
intention to acquire SNETT 
8. ILECs are required to set wholesale rates at their retail price minus "avoided costs." S w h  
costs include various retailing and marketing costs. 
9. The FCC and State Regulatory Commissions interpreted "at cost plus reasonable profit" to 
mean Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost ("TELRIC") which is the forward looking, long 
run, (minimized) economic cost of an unbundled element and includes the competitive return on 
capital. 
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10. The checklist consists of: 
(i) Interconnection in accordance with the requirements of sections 25 1(c)(2) and 252(d)(1). 
(ii) Nondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with the requirements of 
sections 251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1). 
(iii) Nondiscriminatory access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way (...) at just and 
reasonable rates (...). 
(iv) Local loop transmission from the central office to the customer's premises, unbundled 
from local switching or other services. 
(v) Local transport from the trunk side of a wireline local exchange carrier switch unbundled 
from switching or other services. 
(vi) Local switching unbundled from transport, local loop transmission, or other services. 
(vii) Nondiscriminatory access to 
(I) 9 1 1 and E9 1 1 services; 
(11) directory assistance services to allow the other carrier's customers to obtain- 
telephone numbers; and 
(111) operator call completion services. White pages directory listings for customers of 
the other carrier's telephone exchange service. - - 
(ix) Until the date by which telecommunications numbering administration guidelines, plan, 
or rules are established, nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers for assignment 
to the other carrier's telephone exchange service customers After that date, compliance 
with such guidelines, plan, or rules. 
(x) Nondiscriminatory access to databases and associated signaling messary  for call routing -- 
and completion. 
(xi) Until the date by which the Commission issues regulations pursuant to section 251 to 
require number portability, interim telecommunications number portability through remote -- 
call forwarding, direct inward dialing trunks, or other comparable arrangements, with as 
little impairment of functioning, quality, reliability, and convenience as possible. After 
that date, full compliance with such regulations. - 
(xii) Nondiscriminatory access to such services or information as are necessary to allow the 
requesting carrier to implement local dialing parity in accordance with the requirements 
of section 251(b)(3). 
(xiii) Reciprocal compensation arrangements in accordance with the requirements of section 
252(d)(2). 
(xiv) Telecommunications services are available for resale in accordance with the requirements 
of sections 25 1 (c)(4) and 25rt(d)(3). 
- 
11. ILECs also control wholesale services and UNEs, which are vital inputs for providing local 
services. Thus, in the absence of regulation, ILECs are able to control access and entry in the 
local exchange market. 
12. An ILEC entrant in long distance can easily resell long distance service of interexchange 
carriers, as SNET does in Connecticut by reselling Sprint's long distance service, and as 
BellSouth does in out-of-region long distance by reselling AT&T7s long distance service. Thus, 
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even in the short run, an ILEC entry in long distance is not expected to face significantly higher 
costs than IXCs in providing long distance service. 
13. However, Microsoft has been selling its operating system at a relatively low price. This may 
be a consequence of the fact the operating systems are durable. Under some circumstances, a 
durable goods monopolist is forced to sell at prices that are very close to marginal cost. These 
tendencies may be accentuated in the presence of network externalities. Alternatively, the low 
OS price may reflect Microsoft's perception of the existence of significant potential competition 
in the market for operating systems. See Microsoft (1998). 
14. See United States v. Microsoft Corporation (1995). A significant amount of controversy 
arose because Judge Sporkin, the supervising judge, would not approve the consent decree. The 
consent decree was finally signed by Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson. 
15. See United States v. Microsoft Corporation, (1997a). On December 1 1, 1997, Judge Jackson 
also appointed Professor Lawrence Lzssig as a "special master" to advise him on "the complex 
issues of cybertechnology and contract interpretation connected therewith." See United States 
v. Microsoft Corporation, (1997b). Subsequently Microsoft 0b~ctedf;;both the use of a special 
master in principle, as well as to Prof. Lessig himself alleging bias. However, both objections 
were dismissed by the judge in subsequent hearings. Nevertheless, on appeal by Microsoft, the 
Court of Appeals set the Special Master aside, at least temporarily, on the grounds that his 
service may not be necessary. - .- 
16. See United States v. Microsoft Corporation, (1998). 
17. Such behavior has been observed in New Zealand which has weaker regulatory supervision 
and relatively liberal competition laws. The incumbent monopolist, Telecom New Zealand, was 
able to repeatedly thwart efforts of entrants to offer innovative products by using various delaying 
tactics and Iowering the quality of network services. Bernheim and Willig (1996) document 
various cases of raising costs of rivals in the United States. 
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